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Conventional wisdom gives two rationales for investing in the stock
markets of developing countries. The ﬁrst states that the low correlation of
developing-country stock returns with those of developed markets pro-
vides diversiﬁcation opportunities that enable investors in developed coun-
tries to increase the expected return on their portfolio while reducing their
risk. The second states that high rates of economic growth in emerging
markets provide great absolute investment opportunities. Because the rate
of economic growth in most developing countries is expected to exceed the
rate of growth in the developed world for many years to come, the typical
discussion presumes that long-run stock returns in emerging markets will
also exceed those of developed markets (Malkiel and Mei, 1998; Mobius,
1994).
This chapter focuses on the empirical validity of the second rationale. To
what extent do stock returns in developing countries track the real econ-
omy—GDP growth in particular—and is it true that stock returns in
emerging markets are, on average, higher than in developed countries? The
notion that stock returns in fast-growing countries will be higher than
stock returns in slow-growing countries sounds almost too obvious to
question, but the scatter diagram in ﬁgure 8.1 shows that there is no sys-
tematic long-run relationship between stock returns and economic growth
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between stock returns and economic growth statistically insigniﬁcant, the
sign of the relationship actually goes the wrong way—it is negative instead
of positive.
A simple example, using the Solow growth model, helps illustrate why
higher economic growth does not always imply higher stock returns. Con-
sider two emerging market economies (A and B) that are identical and
therefore are growing at the same rate. A standard result of the Solow
model is that an increase in the savings rate of country A will temporarily
raise its rate of growth. It is also a standard result that an increase in the
savings rate will reduce the rate of return to capital. The rate of return falls
because the increase in the savings rate of country A drives up its rate of in-
vestment. Consequently capital becomes less scarce, and the marginal ben-
eﬁt from an additional unit falls. When diminishing returns has run its
course, country A settles down to a new steady state, in which it has the
same growth rate as country B, a higher level of GDP per capita, and a
lower rate of return to capital.
This speciﬁc example illustrates a more general lesson. In order to un-
derstand whether a fast-growing emerging market economy will have
higher stock returns than a slow-growing one, we must ask what accounts
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Fig. 8.1 Stock returns and real GDP growth in emerging market economies 
are uncorrelated
1. Countries included in the scatter plot are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.for the diﬀerence in the two countries’ growth rates of GDP. The stock
market is the aggregate collection of ﬁnancial claims on the real assets of
an economy. Therefore, aggregate stock market returns should be tied to
the rate of return to real assets in the long run. In turn, the rate of return to
real assets depends on their productivity as determined by the interaction
of capital, labor, technology, and institutions. For instance, in contrast to
the previous savings rate example, the Solow Model predicts that high rates
of growth caused by improvements in total factor productivity will raise
the rate of return to capital.
These are not merely academic distinctions. Many scholars attribute the
exceptionally high growth rates of Asian economies over the past three
decades to the rapid rate of capital accumulation, made possible by the
thriftiness of their populations rather than increases in the growth rate of
total factor productivity (Krugman 1994; Young 1995). In the face of di-
minishing returns to capital, and an absence of increases in total factor
productivity, growth rates of GDP per capita will slow to more pedestrian
levels, and the rate of return to capital will fall.
However, a falling rate of return to capital in a given country tells you
nothing about the level of its return to capital relative to rates of return
elsewhere. This distinction is especially relevant when comparing emerging
markets to more developed economies, such as the United States. For this
comparison the convergence story within the neoclassical framework is
more relevant. Emerging markets, which have lower capital-labor ratios
than the United States, will tend to grow faster and have a higher rate of re-
turn to capital. Although East Asian economies have experienced signiﬁ-
cant capital deepening over the past few decades, as mentioned earlier, to
the extent that they started from lower capital-labor ratios than the United
States, their rates of return may still be higher.
A similar caveat about levels versus changes in rates of return applies to
Latin America, a region where country after country in the past two
decades have struggled with, and to varying degrees embraced, economic
reforms. Reforms such as inﬂation stabilization, trade liberalization, and
privatization all have potential to raise total factor productivity. If these re-
forms increase total factor productivity in the region, then they probably
also drive up rates of return. But even if the rate of return to capital in Latin
America is higher today than it was two decades ago, returns there could
still be lower than in the United States.
While neoclassical theory provides the framework for the question of
whether faster rates of economic growth in emerging markets translate into
higher stock returns, our principal goal is to let the data speak for itself. In
section 8.2 of this chapter we document that average realized stock returns
in emerging markets over the last 30 years have not been signiﬁcantly
higher than realized stock returns in the United States. This ﬁnding is par-
ticularly striking in the case of fast-growing regions like Asia, which have
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States.
There are legitimate objections to using realized stock returns to test the
validity of the view that high growth and high stock returns go together.
For instance, high rates of growth may be associated with high expected re-
turns (as opposed to realized returns). To address this concern, section 8.3
constructs measures of expected returns using dividend-price ratios and
earnings yields. Unlike the case of average realized rates of return, we ﬁnd
some evidence that average expected returns in emerging markets have
been signiﬁcantly higher than expected returns in the United States. We
also document that average realized returns in emerging markets have gen-
erally been higher than average expected returns over the past 20 years.
To gain a better understanding of the forces that account for the higher-
than-expected returns in emerging markets over the past two decades, sec-
tion 8.4 presents short vignettes that focus on inﬂation stabilization and
capital account liberalization episodes in Latin America and Asia. The
central, if unsurprising, message that emerges from these vignettes is that
stock markets respond positively to news about major economic reforms.
Insofar as these reforms result in growth that was higher than expected, we
ﬁnd that markets respond positively and yield higher-than-expected re-
turns as well. This signiﬁcant positive correlation between unexpected
growth and unexpected returns is shown to exist in both Latin America
and in Asia.
Building on the discussion in section 8.4, section 8.5 discusses a simple
and consistent explanation for high growth with low returns in Asia and
low growth with high returns in Latin America. High growth implies high
returns only if the stock market has not already capitalized the growth into
current prices. Entering the 1980s, the Asian Tigers had already experi-
enced two decades of rapid output growth, and expectations for the future
were great. In contrast, Latin America entered the 1980s well on its way to
a debt crisis. Starting in 1986, and stretching over the next two decades,
Latin American countries attempted to stabilize inﬂation, liberalize trade,
and privatize state-owned enterprises. While these eﬀorts were not entirely
successful (and similar eﬀorts also occurred in Asia), the very attempt at
reform in Latin America was unexpected and thus probably not priced in.
Hence, relative to the low expectations for the region at the start of the
1980s, Latin America achieved better outcomes than Asia over the next 20
years. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of the regressions car-
ried out in section 8.4, where unexpected returns were shown to be posi-
tively correlated with unexpected growth.
8.2 Data
In order to compare rates of return in emerging economies with those in
mature markets, we compute dollar-denominated, inﬂation-adjusted stock
244 Peter Blair Henry and Prakash Kannanreturns for a number of countries. All of the stock market data come from
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB). We use
the dividend-inclusive, total return index, denominated in U.S. dollars. We
compute a real, inﬂation-adjusted index by deﬂating the total return index
with the U.S. consumer price index. The consumer price index data come
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The EMDB provides the most complete and consistent source of stock
returns across a wide range of developing countries. Nevertheless, the
EMDB data are less than ideal. For some of the larger emerging markets in
Latin America and Asia, we have thirty years of stock returns (1976 to
2005). For other countries, most notably those of Eastern Europe, data are
only available from the early 1990s. For valuation ratios, the data limita-
tions are even greater. Even in the countries with thirty years of stock price
data, price earnings ratios are only available since 1986. By comparison,
long-term studies of the U.S. stock market typically employ time series that
span close to 100 years (Blanchard 1993; Fama and French 2002).
Stock returns over long periods of time provide a reasonable proxy for
the rate of return to capital in an economy, but returns viewed over shorter
horizons may not be as easy to interpret. Because of movement in the busi-
ness cycle and the volatility of returns, our time series may not be long
enough to distinguish meaningful information from noise in the data. Nev-
ertheless, a dataset with limitations is better than no dataset at all, so we
proceed to calculate long-run returns with the data we have.
Table 8.1 summarizes the average annual realized real return and stan-
dard deviation for a selection of twenty emerging market economies dur-
ing the period 1976 to 2005. For each country in the sample we calculate
annual real returns, using continuously compounded growth rates—the
natural log of the inﬂation-adjusted, dividend-inclusive value of the index
at the end of the year minus the natural log of the same variable at the be-
ginning of the year. The average annual real return for a country is the
simple average of its continuously compounded annual return. In turn, 
the average annual return for a particular region is the simple average of
the average annual real return of all countries in that region.2
Panel A of table 8.1 shows that average annual stock returns in emerging
markets over the past thirty years have been 7.78 percent per year, while the
average return on the U.S. market over the same period was 7.69 percent.
The two sets of returns are statistically indistinguishable. Hence, at least
from an ex-post point of view, stock returns in emerging markets are no
higher than stock returns in the United States. Individual country data in
table 8.2 show that the averages are representative of the group as a whole.
The use of country weights to compute regional averages, as opposed to
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2. Note that these numbers diﬀer slightly from the regional averages computed by EMDB
due to the range of countries included and the use of a simple average here as opposed to a
weighted average used in the EMDB computations.simple averages (as used in table 8.1) does not alter our ﬁndings. The
EMDB dataset contains weighted averages of regional returns where the
weighting is done by market capitalization. The average annual return for
the EMDB composite during the period 1985–2005 (data for this series are
only available from 1985 onward) is 8.30 percent compared to an average
return of 9.05 percent in the United States over the same period. Thus, even
when weighted, we ﬁnd that average annual stock returns for emerging
market economies are not higher than returns in the United States. The
EMDB regional averages, which are weighted, also support our ﬁndings
from table 8.1. The average annual return for the Latin American aggregate
is 14.0 for the period 1985–2005, while the comparable ﬁgure for the Asian
aggregate is 5.06 percent.
In contrast to the numbers in Panel A, studies that compute stock re-
turns arithmetically ﬁnd that emerging markets have higher annual returns
than the United States. For instance, Harvey (1995) reports a 20.36 percent
dollar return on the emerging market composite index as compared to a
13.63 percent return on the United States market.3 Arithmetic returns
overstate the ﬁnancial performance of emerging markets. Figure 8.2shows
why. It plots the evolution of the inﬂation-adjusted value of a dollar in-
vested in various stock markets starting in 1975 (with full reinvestment of
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Table 8.1 Realized returns in emerging markets are not signiﬁcantly higher than
realized returns in the United Statesa
Average Standard Sharpe Correlation 
Return Deviation Ratio with U.S.
A: Continuously Compounded Returns
Compositeb 7.78 23.98 0.22 0.21
Latin Americac 10.86 35.24 0.24 0.31
Asiad 6.62 30.05 0.14 0.09
U.S. 7.69 14.57 0.36 1.00
B: Arithmetic Returns
Emerging Market Compositeb 23.57 30.45 0.70 0.22
Latin Americac 31.01 49.40 0.58 0.25
Asiad 16.35 33.83 0.41 0.12
U.S. 9.54 15.81 0.45 1.00
aAnnual rates from 1976–2005, in %.
bComposite returns are the average returns of the following economies: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pak-
istan, Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
cLatin America returns are the average returns of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mex-
ico and Venezuela.
dAsia returns are the average returns of China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Taiwan and Thailand.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ddividends). The arithmetic average of year-by-year arithmetic returns in
the period from 1975 to 1987 is 13.9 percent for Latin America versus 7.8
percent for the United States. This gives the misleading impression that the
value of the Latin American investment at the end of the twelve-year pe-
riod is greater than the value of the U.S. investment when, in fact, the op-
posite is true. A dollar invested in Latin America in 1975 was worth $2.15
in 1987. A dollar invested in the United States over the same period grew
to a value of $2.26.
While continuously compounded mean returns are about the same in
emerging markets as in the United States, the emerging market composite
index displays substantially higher volatility. Column 2 of table 8.1 shows
that the standard deviation of emerging market returns is roughly one and
a half times that of the United States. Accordingly, the Sharpe Ratios in
column 3 indicate that the higher risk associated with emerging markets
has not resulted in higher returns. In spite of the poor absolute perfor-
mance indicated by their Sharpe ratios, it is well known that emerging mar-
kets have the potential to improve the risk-return proﬁle of a balanced
portfolio because of their low correlation with developed countries (Har-
vey 1995). Column 4 of table 8.1 shows that emerging market returns con-
tinue to exhibit relatively low correlation with U.S. returns.
Focusing on returns at the broad level of emerging markets masks sig-
niﬁcant heterogeneity across regions. Compared to returns in the United
States, Latin American stocks produced higher average returns over the
same period. The average-annual return on Latin American stocks was
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Fig. 8.2 The inﬂation-adjusted value of a dollar invested in 197510.86 percent, compared to the 7.69 percent return on U.S. stocks (al-
though this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant). The higher volatility
of Latin American stocks, however, means that they also have low Sharpe
ratios relative to the United States. Meanwhile, stocks in Asia have per-
formed worse on both counts—they have had lower than average returns
than stocks in the United States and higher volatility. Within the group,
stocks in Indonesia, for example, produced an average annual real rate of
return of negative 5 percent over this 30-year period. Even with the exclu-
sion of Indonesia, average stock returns in Asia are only 6.9 percent over
the period.
The relatively low real rate of return on Asian stocks weighs heavily
against the view that high growth generates high returns. While Asian
countries such as China, India, and Korea experienced high rates of growth
relative to the United States and Latin America, the average annual real-
ized return for Asia is the lowest among all three regions. A natural ques-
tion to ask is whether this observation would still hold if we eliminated the
inﬂuence of the 1997 Asian Crisis in our calculations. Three points are in
order here.
First, even excluding the Asian Crisis, average real returns in Asia re-
main lower than in Latin America. Real continuously compounded returns
in Asia from 1975 to 1996 were 10 percent; in Latin America they were
12.48. If instead of eliminating all of the data after 1996, we calculate re-
turns for Asia using all years except 1997, average returns for Asia are 9.53
percent; returns calculated in the same way for Latin America are 10.54
percent.
Second, given the timing of the 1997 Asian Crisis, there is no theoretical
justiﬁcation for excluding data during that time period from our calcula-
tions. The returns series includes an ample number of years following the
crisis to balance any undue inﬂuence that would occur if the series ended
on a down year in the business cycle.
Third, and related to the second point, we are skeptical of throwing away
data. The same instinct that suggests you should calculate Asian returns
without including the 1997 data would also suggest that you throw away
data on stock returns in Latin America during the debt crisis (1982 to
1989). For that matter, why not exclude data from the Mexican and Ar-
gentine crisis periods? Indeed, given the volatility of returns in emerging
markets, we would soon be left with little of an already-limited sample of
data.
The possibility of survivorship bias should be mentioned. A sample that
disproportionately represents ﬁrms or markets that have survived over
time will produce average rates of return that are higher than a sample that
includes failed ﬁrms or markets (see Goetzmann and Jorion 1999). For our
comparison of emerging market returns relative to those of the United
States, the possibility of survivorship bias actually strengthens our conclu-
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in the United States, if we believe that the failure rate of ﬁrms in emerging
markets is higher than in the United States. The eﬀect of survivorship bias
on the comparison between returns in Asia and Latin America, however, is
less clear. It could be argued that the higher degree of turbulence in Latin
American countries accounts for the higher rate of return relative to Asian
economies. However, without more detailed ﬁrm-level data in these econ-
omies, we cannot know the extent of the bias, if it exists.
On the whole, the data in table 8.1 demonstrate that historical stock re-
turns provide little support to the view that higher growth rates and higher
risk in emerging markets produce commensurately higher rates of return.
The evidence in table 8.1, however, requires a cautious interpretation. The
data on realized returns span a thirty-year period during which a number
of crises and reforms occurred in the developing world. As such, it may be
the case that the average realized rates of return computed in table 8.1 diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from the average expected returns in these economies over the
period. We turn our attention to this distinction in the next section.
8.3 Expected Returns Versus Realized Returns
In order to compute expected rates of return we begin by using the con-
stant dividend-growth model, or as it is more popularly known, the Gor-
don Model (Gordon 1962). The Gordon model states that the price of a
stock should be equal to the dividend payment divided by the diﬀerence be-
tween the required rate of return for the stock and the expected long-term
growth rate of dividends:
(1) P   ,
where Dis the dividend, Pis the stock price,  is the required rate of return,
and ge is the expected growth rate of the dividend stream. Rearranging
equation (1) with  on the left-hand-side gives an expression that states that
the required rate of return on a stock is the sum of its current dividend-
price ratio and the expected growth rate of future dividends:
(2)     ge
In order to use equation (2) to compute expected returns, we need a mea-
sure of expected future growth rates that we can add to the dividend-price
ratio data we obtain from the EMDB. Because capital’s share in national
output within a given country does not ﬂuctuate much over time (although
it may vary signiﬁcantly across countries), it is reasonable to assume that
in the long-run, earnings grow at the same rate as gross domestic product







250 Peter Blair Henry and Prakash Kannanpected future growth rate of GDP. Here we turn to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) publication, the World Economic Outlook (WEO).
The WEOprovides annual analysis and forecasts for the world economy.
Every year, the WEO produces three sets of numbers for a variety of coun-
tries and regions: (a) A forecast of GDP growth for the current year (year
[0]); (b) a forecast of growth for the following year (year [ 1]); and (c) a
forecast of the average expected growth rate for the next four years (years
[ 2 to  5]).4Since the Gordon model assumes a constant expected future
growth rate, the proper empirical analogue for ge is a long-term forecast,
not the growth forecast for any single year. In order to capture the spirit of
the model, we calculate ge as the geometric average of the three numbers
provided in the WEO forecast—in essence, the average expected growth
rate over the next ﬁve years.
A simple example may help. Suppose that we want to calculate the ex-
pected return for Latin America in 1995. The ﬁrst step is to produce, from
the perspective of a market investor in 1995, a forecast of the expected fu-
ture dividend growth rate. To do so, we open the 1995 issue of the WEO
and ﬁnd that the forecast for Latin American growth (as approximated by
the Western Hemisphere region) in 1995 was 2.1 percent, the forecast for
1996 was 4.0 percent, and the forecast for 1997 through 2000 was an an-
nual growth rate of 5.3 percent. Given these three numbers, our estimate of
the expected future dividend growth rate for Latin America in 1995 is 4.5
percent.
Table 8.3 presents our calculations of average expected returns from
1985 to 2005. The time period in table 8.3 is shorter than that for table 8.1,
because data on the dividend price ratio for the individual economies is
only available since 1985. Table 8.3 also presents data on the values of the
underlying variables that comprise our calculation of expected returns.
Column 1 gives the dividend-price ratio, column 2 the expected future
growth rate of dividends. Column 3, which presents the sum of the ﬁrst two
columns, shows that over the period 1985–2005, average expected returns
for the Composite Emerging Market Index, Latin America, and Asia were
all higher than average expected returns in the United States.
To test whether these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant we pooled
the expected-returns data and then ran a regression of annual expected re-
turns on a constant and regional dummies (with the United States as a
base). The coeﬃcients on all of the regional dummies were signiﬁcant. In
other words, from 1985 to 2005, expected returns in Asia, Latin America,
and emerging markets as a whole were signiﬁcantly higher than expected
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4. Strictly speaking, the IMF only began to consistently publish forecasts for developing
economies along the lines mentioned in the main text from their 1995 issue of the WEO. For
the earlier years, we used the regional growth forecasts for “net debtor developing countries.”
The composition of countries between the two groups is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Where
possible, we use the September/October issue of the WEO for that year.returns in the United States. In contrast, the average realized returns for
Asia, Latin America, and the composite emerging market index in table 8.1
were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the realized returns for the United
States.
It is also instructive to compare expected returns with realized returns
for a given region. Column 5 in table 8.3 shows the average realized annual
return for each region over the same time period. For every emerging mar-
ket region except Asia, we ﬁnd that average realized returns exceeded av-
erage expected returns over the past two decades. Average realized returns
for the United States also exceeded average expected returns over the pe-
riod. This result is consistent with Fama and French (2002). Using an
equation analogous to equation (2), they ﬁnd that average realized returns
for the United States over the period 1951–2000 were much higher than the
average expected return.
8.3.1 Expected Returns Using the Earnings Yield
Using the dividend-price ratio to calculate expected returns has its dis-
advantages. As we can see from equation (2), the expected rate of return de-
pends on dividend policy. For instance, suppose that earnings rise, but
ﬁrms decide not to increase their cash payouts to shareholders. Because
earnings rise, so will the ﬁrm’s stock price. But without any change in div-
idend policy, the dividend price ratio will fall, thereby reducing the level of
expected returns implied by equation (2). If the increase in earnings were
permanent, one would eventually expect an increase in payouts. But given
the persistence of dividend policy, the shortness of our earnings-yield se-
ries, and the increasing tendency of ﬁrms to distribute payouts in forms
other than dividends, the change in earnings could have a nontrivial im-
pact on our calculation of expected returns. This is an unattractive feature,
because dividend policy is independent of real operations, like investment
decisions, that ultimately drive fundamental ﬁrm value (Modigliani and
Miller 1958).
Since earnings, not dividends, drive long-run value, the earnings yield
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Table 8.3 Expected returns in emerging markets versus the United States 1985–2005
Expected Expected
return: return: Realized Realized 
D/P ge DP + ge E/Pa return Growth
Emerging market composite 3.17 5.24 8.41 6.27 10.32 5.48
Latin America 3.85 3.89 7.74 9.69 14.68 2.94
Asia 1.86 6.47 8.33 4.17 7.01 7.41
U.S. 2.48 2.83 5.31 4.96 9.05 2.98
aEarnings-price data only begin from 1986.E/P provides a more robust measure of aggregate expected returns.5 It is
true that for a given ﬁrm, the earnings yield may not accurately measure its
expected return. The ﬁrm’s earnings yield accurately measures the ﬁrm’s
expected returns only when the marginal product of capital equals the cost
of capital. When the ﬁrm’s marginal product of capital exceeds its cost of
capital, then the earnings yield will understate the ﬁrm’s expected rate of
return, and vice versa. While it is reasonable to expect that any ﬁrm may
earn positive or negative economic proﬁts for some period of time, there is
no reason to think the same is true for the economy as a whole.
Column 4 of table 8.3 presents average earnings yields for the Compos-
ite Emerging Market Index, for Asia, Latin America, and the United
States. The basic message about expected returns in emerging markets ver-
sus the United States does not change when we use earnings yields. With
the exception of Asia, the average earnings yield for all emerging market
regions between 1986 and 2005 was higher than in the United States. The
average level of expected returns was 9.69 for Latin America, 6.27 for all
emerging markets, and 4.17 for Asia. The average level of earnings yields
for the United States during this period was 4.96. It is also worth noting
that for any given region, average realized returns always exceed average
earnings yields. However, given the shortness of the time series and the
volatility of realized returns, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Two main points emerge from table 8.3. First, unlike the realized rates of
return computed in table 8.1, expected rates of return in emerging markets
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from expected returns in the United States. Us-
ing either the earnings yield or the dividend-price-ratio-based measure, av-
erage expected returns over the period 1985–2005 were higher in Latin
America and Asia than in the United States. Second, almost without ex-
ception, average realized returns in emerging economies over the past two
decades have been higher than expected. The question, then, is: what
forces drive average realized returns in emerging market economies away
from average expected returns? This is the topic to which we now turn.
8.4 Regional Vignettes
There are many potential explanations for the diﬀerence between real-
ized and expected returns in emerging markets, but the economic reforms
of the past two decades surely play a very prominent role. The most im-
portant issue in Latin America is the vanquishing of high inﬂation. Figure
8.3 shows that inﬂation began a precipitous decline in 1991 and continued
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5. Mankiw (2005) also argues for the use of the earnings-price ratio over the dividend price
ratio.falling through the 1990s. Latin America’s disinﬂation is even more im-
pressive when viewed in event time (ﬁgure 8.4).
Year 0 on the x-axis of ﬁgure 8.4 corresponds to the year in which each
of the four successful disinﬂation episodes in the sample took place: the
Mexican Pacto in 1987, Argentina’s Convertibility Plan in 1991, the Real
Plan in Brazil in 1994, and Chile’s more garden-variety stabilization in
1989 under its last IMF program to date. Of course, the reduction in inﬂa-
tion is only part of the story. Immediately preceding the drop in inﬂation in
1991, Mexico became the ﬁrst country to receive debt relief under the
Brady Plan (1989), Brazil substantially liberalized trade (1990), and Vene-
zuela opened its stock market to foreign investment (1990).
To examine whether the good news of economic reforms in Latin Amer-
ica drove up realized returns relative to expected returns, deﬁne the vari-
able, UNEXPECTED RETURNS, as the realized return on the stock market
in a given year, minus the expected return on the stock market (as measured
in table 8.3) in the same year. For example, in 1991 the unexpected return
is 77.8 percent using the earnings-based measure of expected returns and
81.9 percent using the dividend-based measure. The unexpected returns
variable captures the extent to which new information drives a wedge be-
tween expected returns and realized returns. For instance, news about
changes in policy may lead to unexpected capital gains because changes in
policy lead to unexpected changes in growth. Indeed, in 1991 realized
growth in Latin America exceeded expected growth by almost a full per-
centage point (3.9 versus 3.16).
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Fig. 8.3 Latin America, average inﬂation rate (annual percentage change in CPI)The relation between unexpected returns and unexpected growth also
works in the other direction. In 1994, the WEO forecasted that GDP in
Latin America would grow by 3.3 percent in 1995. In December of 1994,
Mexico devalued the peso, plunging the country into a full-ﬂedged ﬁnan-
cial crisis. The peso crisis sent shock waves throughout Latin America. In
order to maintain its ﬁxed exchange rate, Argentina raised interest rates, ﬁ-
nancial tightening ensued throughout the region, and economic activity
slowed accordingly. As a consequence, Latin America grew by only 1.8 per-
cent in 1995. With realized growth falling 1.5 percentage points (1.8 minus
3.3) short of expectations for that year, Latin American stock returns also
came in lower than expected. The unexpected return variable in 1995 was
negative 28.7 percent using the earnings measure of expected returns and
negative 27.3 percent using the dividend measure.
More generally, a signiﬁcant correlation exists between unexpected re-
turns and unexpected growth in Latin America:
(3) UNEXPECTED RETURN  15.2  8.7  UNEXPECTED GROWTH
(7.0) (3.7)
Adjusted R-Squared   0.184, N   21 (standard errors in parentheses).
8.4.1 East Asia
The emerging economies of East Asia did not have the serious inﬂation
problems of Latin America. But like Latin America, the East Asian econ-
omies also began opening their stock markets to foreign investment in the
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Fig. 8.4 Inﬂation rates in Latin American countries around stabilization episodes1980s. Signiﬁcant liberalizations of restrictions of foreign ownership of
domestic stocks took place in the Philippines in 1986, Taiwan in 1986, In-
dia in 1986, Malaysia in 1987, South Korea in 1987, and Thailand in 1988.
Because emerging economies are capital-scarce relative to the developed
world, opening the stock market to foreign investment has the potential to
reduce a country’s cost of capital.6 Figure 8.5 suggests that the cost of cap-
ital may indeed fall when countries liberalize. The graph displays the pro-
ﬁle of the average dividend yield across each of the ﬁve Asian economies
that liberalized between 1986 and 1988. The average dividend yield falls by
231 basis points as a result of liberalization. The average growth forecast
rises by ﬁfty-one basis points. From equation (2), the approximate fall in
the cost of capital is equal to the diﬀerence—180 basis points.
When a country experiences an unexpected fall in its cost of capital,
stock prices should increase, thereby generating a positive unexpected re-
turn. Consistent with the notion that liberalization generates positive 
unexpected returns, during the three-year period from 1986 to 1988, the
average wedge between realized returns and expected returns in the ﬁve
Asian economies was 28.1 percent, according to the earnings-based mea-
sure of expected returns, and 25.9 percent according to the dividend-based
measure.
A lower cost of capital also has real implications—namely, more invest-
ment, and faster economic growth in the short term (Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad 2005; Henry 2000b; Henry 2003). Accordingly, over the three-
year liberalization period from 1986 to 1988, actual GDP growth in emerg-
ing Asia exceeds expected growth by an average of 1.9 percentage points
per year (7.8 versus 5.9 percent). Again, as in Latin America, a more gen-
eral correlation holds between unexpected returns and unexpected growth:
(4) UNEXPECTEDRETURN    13.9  13.4   UNEXPECTEDGROWTH
(8.3) (5.3)
Adjusted R-Squared   0. 21, N   21 (standard errors in parentheses)
The negative intercept term in equation (4) reﬂects the extreme inﬂuence
of the Asian crisis on estimates of unexpected returns in a regression with
only 21 data points. Nevertheless, we learn a lot from the outlier, which is
the Asian crisis of 1997. In 1997, the actual growth rate of GDP in In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand was four percentage points below
expected growth, and realized returns were 90.1 percentage points less
than expected returns.
Pooling all of the available data, we also estimate the average relation-
ship between unexpected returns and unexpected growth across Latin
America, Asia, and developed markets:
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6. See Stulz (1999), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and Henry (2000a) for detailed discussions
about the impact of liberalization on the cost of capital.(5) UNEXPECTED RETURN   2.9   5.9   UNEXPECTED GROWTH
(3.3) (2.2)
Adjusted R-Squared   0.09, N   63 (standard errors in parentheses)
The general message here is that unexpected growth signiﬁcantly predicts
unexpected returns. Not surprisingly, from 2002 to 2005, GDP growth in
emerging markets has been stronger than expected and realized returns
have exceeded expected returns.
8.5 Discussion
From 1985 to 2005, the average realized return on Latin American
stocks was 14.68 percent per year (table 8.3). Realized returns consist of
dividend yields plus capital gains. Since the average dividend yield for
Latin America over the period was 3.85 percent per year, average annual
capital gains come to 10.83 percent per year. The corresponding ﬁgures for
Asia are realized returns of 7.01 percent per year, a dividend yield of 1.86
per year, and a capital gain of 5.15 percent per year. In other words, over
the past twenty years, capital gains in Latin America exceeded those in
Asia by a factor of two. Yet over the same period of time, average annual
inﬂation in Asia was much lower than in Latin America—6.4 percent ver-
sus 167 percent—and growth was much higher—7.41 percent per year as
compared to 2.91 percent per year. What can explain these facts?
Unexpected changes in the economic environment cause unexpected
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Fig. 8.5 Dividend-yields in Asian economies around capital account 
liberalization episodescapital gains (or losses). Relative to initial expectations, Latin America has
had better outcomes than Asia over the past two decades. Taken at face
value, this assertion sounds a bit far-fetched, but it becomes less so upon
deeper reﬂection. In the 1980s the Asian Tigers were well on their way to
achieving the status of newly industrializing countries. They had already
experienced two decades of rapid output growth and their expectations for
the future were great. Accordingly, price-earnings ratios in Asia were high
in 1986—18.29, to be exact. In contrast, the early 1980s saw Latin Amer-
ica fall headlong into a debt crisis. Inﬂation was high, growth was low, and
perhaps most importantly, growth rates in Latin America had begun to di-
verge substantially from those in Asia (see ﬁgure 8.6). The price-earnings
ratio of 3.53 for Latin American stocks in 1986 reﬂected a dismal outlook
for the region.
In short, a simple and consistent explanation for high growth with low
returns in Asia and low growth with high returns in Latin America goes as
follows: High growth implies high returns only if the stock market has not
already capitalized the growth into current prices. To the extent that cor-
porate earnings grow, so will stock prices. When there is good news about
the future that is not captured in current earnings, prices will increase rel-
ative to earnings, and shareholders will experience unexpected capital
gains.
In 1986, price-earnings ratios in Latin America and Asia were substan-
tially diﬀerent. Stock markets in Asia had already priced-in high expected
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Fig. 8.6 GDP growth in Asia and Latin America, 1976–1983 (converted at market
exchange rate)
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bankfuture growth, but by reducing the cost of capital, opening the stock mar-
ket to foreign investors generated some unexpected capital gains in the
mid- to late-1980s (ﬁgure 8.5). However, in addition to opening to foreign
capital ﬂows, Latin American countries also attempted to stabilize inﬂa-
tion, liberalize trade, and privatize state-owned enterprises. While these
eﬀorts were not uniformly successful (and some also occurred in Asia), the
very attempt to move the region in this direction was a shock, given low ex-
pectations at the time. Hence, the scope of reforms and the magnitude of
unexpected capital gains in Asia were modest in comparison with what was
yet to occur in Latin America.
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There are good reasons to believe that stock prices will rise in emerging
economies with high economic growth rates. High economic growth is usu-
ally supported by high corporate earning growth. High corporate earning
growth should make stock prices soar.
But, after examining the data of stock returns from emerging market
countries, Peter Henry reports that the positive relationship between high
economic growth and high stock returns is not conﬁrmed among emerging
markets or in a comparison between the emerging market and the United
States or even in the comparison of East Asia and Latin America. Then,
Henry tries to investigate why the educated guess of the positive associa-
tion of economic growth and stock returns is not observed in the data.
Is it true that growth theory predicts the positive association? Henry
points out that according to a standard Solow model, the positive associa-
tion may not be obtained. Suppose two economies grow at the same steady
state. One economy increases the saving rate, then experiences a temporal
increase in growth rate on the way to a new steady state with a higher cap-
ital/labor ratio. But when the new steady state is obtained, the growth rate
comes back to the original rate (since the growth rate is independent of the
saving rate at any steady state), while the return to capital is decreased.
However, this comparison, explained by Henry, is not fair. The comparison
of the emerging market economies and the United States, or the compari-
son of low-middle income emerging market and middle-income emerging
market economies, should be cast in the convergence story of growth rate.
The country with a lower level of income should have higher growth and
higher return to capital, while the country with high level of income, near
the global steady state, should have a lower growth rate and lower return
to capital. The positive association is predicted.
Henry then points out the possibility that the Asian growth may have
been expected (at the beginning of the sample period of his study). The
stock prices back then may have already discounted the high growth and
high returns in the future. Therefore, ex-post returns may not be as high as
economic growth. The expected returns were constructed using the IMF
World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecasts as expected growth of corpo-
rate yields. The table (table 8.2), using data of 1985–2000, shows the fol-
lowing: (a) the expected returns were highest in Asia, followed by Latin
America, and last the United States; (b) realized returns were higher than
expected returns, especially so in Latin America; (c) realized returns were
highest in Latin America, followed by the United States, and last Asia; (d)
realized growth was highest in Asia followed by the United States and,
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research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.equally, Latin America. These facts seem to be quite surprising. Henry in-
terpreted the set of results as the already high expectation of Asian growth
in 1985, while Latin American countries experienced high unexpected
growth and stock returns. Causality may run from stock prices to growth.
However, WEO projections may be too remote to expected growth of
earning yields, although the WEO projections may be good proxies for ex-
pected economic growth rate. It can be tested in a long-time series of ad-
vanced countries whether stock returns really predict future economic
growth.
A grouping of Asia and Latin America may be too crude, in that indi-
vidual countries have very diﬀerent results, as shown in table 8.2. The re-
turns also widely ﬂuctuate from year to year; for example, in Argentina,
from –100.5% in 1982 to  156.2% in 1991. It is important to examine the
performance of individual countries as well as the region. 
Possible explanations that are not examined in Henry’s chapter included
the following factors. First, the stock price index of an emerging market
economy may not have a representative group of ﬁrms. In an emerging
market economy, it may be the case that the stock market, that is sometimes
heavily regulated with some policy intentions, is represented with unfairly
large weights by (former) state-owned companies or traditional resource-
related companies, while economic growth is mostly realized by activities
of (joint venture) companies with foreign direct investment (FDI), and
FDI companies may not be listed in the stock market. Second, the emerg-
ing market stock returns, especially those of Asian countries, may be actu-
ally high for the U.S. based investors, if the returns are measured in the U.S.
dollars, since the exchange rates of high economic growth countries tend
to appreciate (i.e., the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect). Third, several emerging
market economies started to grow when they implemented various eco-
nomic reforms and opened their economies to foreign investment. The
opening of the economy had impacts on economic growth, through pro-
moting more investment and introducing modern corporate governance.
Stock returns will also rise soon after, if not at the same time, as economic
reforms, as the stock prices start to reﬂect future earning growth. Since
timing of economic reform is diﬀerent for diﬀerent countries, the event
study is called for. A study of lining up the timing of economic reform, a
jump in economic growth, and a jump in stock prices may reveal an inter-
esting time-series causality of economic growth and stock returns, and pro-
vide richer data to Henry’s work.
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This chapter starts from the observation that, despite higher growth rates,
emerging markets are not necessarily characterized by higher stock returns
compared to more developed economies. This ﬁnding may be at odds with
prior expectations of some economists, especially if their intuition comes
from the neoclassical growth model (whose main feature is diminishing re-
turns to capital) with no cross country diﬀerences in technology. To inves-
tigate the source of this contradiction, the authors decompose those real-
ized stock returns into expected and unexpected returns. They ﬁnd the
following two: (a) the average expected returns are no higher in emerging
markets than among developed countries, and (b) there is a great deal of
heterogeneity among emerging markets. Hence, the objective of the chap-
ter is twofold: to study why the average expected returns are not higher in
emerging markets, and to ﬁnd sources of the diﬀerences among those mar-
kets. In my view, the latter is the more important (and interesting!) as, given
the large diversity within the emerging market group, the group average is
not likely to have much economic signiﬁcance. Results from the regional
comparisons are sensitive to the way expected returns are computed, but
when they are calculated by the earnings yield (the method that seems to
be slightly favored by the authors), Latin America has much higher ex-
pected returns than the United States, which in turn has higher expected
returns than Asia. The authors propose the following interpretation. At
the beginning of the sample period of their analysis (1985), subsequent
strong growth of Asia had already been largely anticipated. As a conse-
quence, it was already reﬂected in its stock prices, not expected returns. By
contrast, Latin America’s high growth was a consequence of reform eﬀorts
by the governments, which were unexpected as of 1985.
This chapter raises important questions. Perhaps some researchers had
sensed a need to explore them in the past, but none (to my knowledge)
faced them with the same degree of seriousness as do the authors of the
chapter. It is my hope that much work will follow to answer the questions
put forth by the authors. My comments are as follows:
Survivorship Bias
The authors have at least partially responded to my comments regard-
ing this point in the revised version of the chapter, but let me discuss it one
more time here, as it can potentially be important. Presumably, the stock
returns data are constructed by taking averages of ﬁrms existing in the
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versity.market at each point in time (though the authors do not discuss the data
construction in much detail). Those ﬁrms that disappear in the middle will
not be considered in the calculation of the stock indices in subsequent pe-
riods. This means that, toward the end of the sample period, “survivors”
will be over-represented in the sample. This could introduce an upward
bias in the computed average returns: the fact that the average over the
sample period was, say, 10 percent does not necessarily mean that one
could have earned 10 percent by investing in an average ﬁrm at the begin-
ning of the sample. This problem could be particularly serious in crisis-
ridden emerging markets. As the authors point out in the revised version,
this problem may not be so consequential to the discussion on the com-
parison between the United States and emerging markets as a whole, but
could be important in the comparison between diﬀerent emerging markets
(which, as I said above, is more interesting in my view). As the authors say,
it is not clear in which market the bias is stronger. It may be that, as Latin
America has had more crises, the bias is larger there than in Asia. But the
depth of the crises should also matter. I hope future work will shed more
light on this issue.
Was Asia’s High Growth Anticipated in 1985?
Note that Asia in this chapter includes not only the “tigers,” but late-
comers such as China and India. To test whether we could have predicted
Asia’s strong growth based on what we knew as of 1985, I run the follow-
ing Barro-style cross country regression. The left-hand side variable is each
country’s growth rate of per capita GDP (PPP based) between 1985 and
2000. The explanatory variables are GDP per capita (denoted by y), ratio
of investment to GDP (denoted as I/Y), ratio of government spending to
GDP (denoted as G/Y), a measure of openness (exports plus imports as ra-
tio to GDP, denoted as Open), all measured as of 1985. I also included
dummies for Asia and Latin America (as deﬁned in the same way as in the
chapter), denoted Asiaand LA, respectively. Data source is the Penn World
Table, and the sample size was 103. Here is the result:
(Growth rate, 1985 2000)   0.04*y   0.045 (I/Y)   0.009 (G/Y) 
  0.011** Open   0.033** Asia   0.001 LA   0.043 (R2   0.272)
In the above, “*,” “**,” and “***” indicate signiﬁcance at the 10 percent,
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Note that the Asia dummy is
highly signiﬁcantly positive, even after controlling for the eﬀects of other
variables that might aﬀect the growth rate. Judging from this, it seems diﬃ-
cult to conclude that Asia’s high growth was already anticipated in 1985. I
also tried including the growth rate between 1965 and 1985 as an additional
explanatory variable, but the results were unchanged. Other modiﬁcations
did not overturn the results, either.
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Throughout the chapter, the underlying assumption is that the emerging
markets are not fully integrated into the world ﬁnancial market. If they
were, expected returns would be identical everywhere, and diﬀerent
prospects for earnings would be reﬂected entirely in stock price diﬀeren-
tials, not in returns diﬀerentials. (Of course, realistically, one would also
have to worry about risk premia.) This argument suggests that there is a
potentially important determinant of expected returns in each market, not
fully discussed in the chapter—degree of integration into the world ﬁnan-
cial market. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Asia and Latin Amer-
ica would have the same value of expected returns under autarky, and that
this rate would be higher than those in developed countries. Suppose, fur-
ther, that the Asian market is actually more integrated into the world mar-
ket. Then the actual expected returns would be lower in Asia. A similar ar-
gument could be applied along the time series dimension: a country that
experiences a reform that enhances the integration would have lower ex-
pected returns in the post reform period (though the reform itself is likely
to produce windfall gains in the short run, as discussed by the authors).
Hence, historical averages may not be very useful indicators for the current
expected returns in such a country. I hope future work will deal with this
issue properly.
Expected Returns vs. Stock Prices
As stated earlier, the authors’ explanation for the low expected returns
in Asia (despite its fast growth) was that the growth was largely expected
from the beginning, and thus was reﬂected in the levels of stock prices, not
returns. If we push this argument further, and assume that anyprospect for
growth would be reﬂected in stock prices, we would reach a rather uncom-
fortable conclusion that there should be no correlation whatsoever be-
tween expected growth and expected returns in the world. But this is
against our intuition. The relationship between growth and prices/returns
is probably a more intricate one, and we need more guidance from growth
theory (not the Solow-Swan model, in which expectation plays no role, but
the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model) to understand what kinds of growth
prospects are reﬂected solely in stock prices, and what kinds aﬀect returns
as well. For example, the theory predicts that, if growth is high because of
a higher current TFP, the current marginal product of capital would also
be higher and that should aﬀect expected returns on ﬁnancial assets. On
the other hand, a higher future TFP leaves the current marginal product
unchanged but increases current stock prices.
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As I stated in the beginning, the fact that emerging markets do not nec-
essarily exhibit higher returns may be surprising for students of growth the-
ory, if they assume that the levels of technology are the same across coun-
tries. However, recent literature on growth has paid much attention on the
diﬀerences in the levels of technology “broadly deﬁned.” They include the
level of ﬁnancial development (King and Levine 1993), human capital (Lu-
cas 1988, 1990), governmental institutions, public capital, and social capi-
tal (Knack and Keefer 1997), among others. By borrowing those ideas
from this old literature, I believe this literature on stock market returns will
be much more enriched.
Some More Discussions on Institutional Details Would Be Useful
Many emerging markets have experienced fundamental changes in eco-
nomic institutions in the past few decades. One might worry if a market to-
day can be reasonably considered the same as the beginning of the sample
period. Some discussion on the stability (or instability) of institutional fea-
tures of each market would be quite useful to the reader.
Other Comments
Table 8.2 of the chapter, which shows ﬂuctuations in realized returns in
each market, is quite informative. The returns show large year-to-year ﬂuc-
tuations. This makes me wonder if the estimation results in the chapter are
sensitive to the sample period, especially in which year the sample ends. In
the discussion on the eﬀects of reforms in Latin America, it would be in-
teresting if the authors could separately estimate the eﬀects of reforms per
se and those of the foreign assistance that was given to the country condi-
tional on implementation of the reforms.
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